sexta-feira, 23 de novembro de 2007

A política externa de Lula da Silva 2003-2007

Tópicos da aula e resumo do texto "Lula's Foreign Policy" feito pelo Roger.


Lula da Silva
-> Ministro Celso Amorim, secretário geral Samoel Pinheiro Guimarães e acessor especial da República Marco Aurélio Garcia.
  • Autonomia pela diversificação: adesão aos regimes internacionais por meio de alianças Sul-Sul (G20), criação de alianças regionais com parceiros não tradicionais (IBSA).
  • Conciliação de uma política econômica ortodoxa com uma política externa heterodoxa: o legado desenvolvimentista considerado por algumas burocracias recupera espaço na política externa.
  • Não houve ruptura com FHC quanto ao conteúdo da política externa, mas houve mudanças significativas na ênfase em algumas opções estratégicas (alianças regionais com parceiros não tradicionais).
  • 3 objetivos: acordo agrícola em Doha (domínio do Itamaraty), campanha pela reforma CSNU (domínio do Itamaraty) e criação da CASA (divisão do trabalho Itamaraty - Presidência PT).
  • Preferência pela África, Ásia e América do Sul como estratégia contra-hegemônica.
  • Declaração pública de líder da América do Sul na contraposição às dificuldades de operacionalizar.
  • A diversificação implica em investir em áreas onde não há interesse concreto imediato (mesma crítica à autonomia pela distância de Geisel)
  • FHC enfatiza uma ordem internacional cujo centro são os EUA e sua unipolaridade benigna, ao passo que Lula enfatiza uma ordem mais plural, proporcionando alianças Sul-Sul e movimento contra-hegemônico.

Alinhamento/Credibilidade X Autonomia/Universalismo

Resumo do texo

“Change: this is the key word; this was the message sounded out by the Brazilian society in the October elections. Hope has overcome fear and the people have decided that the time has come to follow a new path. […] this is why the people elected me president of the Republic: to bring about change.” (Lula da Silva, 2003a: 27-28). Many of the initiatives by the Lula da Silva administration are situated on the slopes of international commercial negotiations and the search for political co-ordination with emerging and developing countries, namely India, South Africa, Russia and China. South American relations also merit special attention

We believe that the September 11th attacks and the difficulties coming from the Doha Round were external shocks and collaborated toward the change in Brazilian foreign policy. Some changes came at the end of the Cardoso administration, bringing elements which were only made clear in the Lula da Silva administration. We believe, however, that no significant domestic restructuring occurred to the extent of causing a shift from the Cardoso foreign policy to that of Lula’s. As suggested by some authors (Fonseca Jr. 1998), the foreign policy from 1985 to 2002, which had its beginning at the end of the Sarney government (1985-1989) and the Collor de Mello government (1990-1992), was influenced by the perspective of the end of the Cold War and by the idea that a strengthened international cooperation would be possible. Therefore, the September 11th attacks and the negative outcome of the Doha Round ended up influencing the policy formulators, together with a changing international context, and being favored by two very different Brazilian presidents in regard to their distinctive “walk of life”.

“the election of Luis Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva to the presidency in 2003 heralded a change in tone and substance in Brazilian foreign policy. A concerted effort was made to court Southern States […]. Coupled with this was the raising of rhetorical concern for the poor […]The Cardoso foreign policy defended the ‘autonomy through participation’ idea within the international system, opposing ‘autonomy through distance’ which prevailed until the end of the Sarney administration (Vigevani and Oliveira, 2004; Fonseca Jr., 1998). In his turn, Lula sought to insert Brazil in the global scenario in an autonomous way, diversifying partnerships and Brazilian strategic options. Although elements of change in the country’s course existed in the Cardoso administration, Lula da Silva uses a strategy baptized ‘autonomy through diversification”, emphasizing South-South cooperation, bringing about more equilibrium with the countries of the North, promoting adjustments, increasing the nation’s leadership character and consolidating program changes in foreign policy.


We synthetically define (1) autonomy through distance as a non-automatically accepting policy of prevailing international regimes, with the belief in partial autarchy development focused on the internal market. Consequently, a diplomacy that puts itself against certain aspects of the agendas of the super powers so as to preserve the National State’s sovereignty; (2) autonomy through participation as the adhesion to international regimes, especially those more liberal, but without the loss of foreign policy management. In this case, the objective would be to influence their own formulation of principles and rules that dictate the international system; (3) autonomy through diversification as a nation’s adhesion to international norms and principles by means of South-South Alliances, including regional alliances, and through agreements with non-traditional partners (China, Pacific Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, etc.), for it is believed that they reduce asymmetries on external relations with the more powerful countries, and increase national negotiating capacity.


The apparent changes to Lula da Silva administration had some directives: (1) to contribute toward the search for greater equilibrium and attenuate unilateralism; (2) to strengthen bilateral and multilateral relations in order to increase the countries weight in political and economical negotiations on an international level; (3) to deepen relations so as to benefit from possibly greater economical, financial, technological and cultural interchange; (4) to avoid agreements that could jeopardise development in the long term. These directives, throughout the first period of the government (2003-2006), probably improving in the second period, implied precise emphasis: (1) a deepening of the South American Community of Nations (SACN); (2) intensification of relations between emerging countries such as India, China, Russia and South Africa; (3) projection at the Doha Round and World Trade Organization, as it was in other international negotiations; (4) maintenance of relations and the development of economic relations with rich countries, including the United States; (5) the undertaking and narrowing of relations with African countries; (6) campaign for the reform of the United Nations Security Council for a permanent seat for Brazil; (7) defence of social objectives allowing for a greater equilibrium between the States and populations.


“Brazil, in the execution of its foreign policy, which is always orientated by constitutional principles, has to react to the political initiatives of the great powers, especially the superpower: the United States. Brazil has to articulate political, economical and technological alliances with peripheral states of the international system to defend and protect its interests. Brazil has to transform its traditional relations with the super powers: relations which find themselves historically unbalanced” (Guimarães, 2006).

the autonomy through diversification seeks to realize adjustments and program changes inspired by the idea of autonomy through distance within a not-so-far international scenario, in various aspects, in the period when the autonomy through participation strategy predominated“Keeping with the same spirit [of IBSA], we are coordinating a group of 20 agricultural exporters from developing countries – G-20, formed at the Ministerial Conference in Cancun, as a voice in favor of a greater liberalization of agricultural trade, contrary to the billions spent in subsidies that distort the market” (Amorim, 2004: 161). Lula da Silva’s foreign policy, maintaining its multilateralism, defends national sovereignty more emphatically than the previous government. This characteristic, in agreement with autonomy through diversification, gained relevance and was interpreted at moments as a sentiment of leadership, in a regional aspect


The Haitian case serves to perfectly exemplify the meaning of autonomy through diversification. Diversification does not only mean the search for relationship alternatives with other States. It also implicates capacity for intervention in areas that are not of its immediate interest. It means intervening in areas that refer to internationally recognized public goods. Brazil chose to assume this responsibility, supported by other countries of the region, as Chile and Argentina, because of its objective that goes beyond costs, and strengthens the country’s international role


The policy of Lula da Silva has risks and in part shows the new geography of world power and economy. Using the Brazilian export percentages, important though unable to explain the complexity of the scenario, we verify that imports from the traditional markets (United States, European Union, Japan, Canada, Mexico and Mercosul) decreased from 79.3% to 67.2%. As for the non-traditional markets (China, Asia Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, etc.), it increased from 19.7% to 31% in the same period (Prates, 2005: 138).The FTAA is not a destiny for Brazil, but an option, and only worthwhile from the moment it becomes congruent with the country’s development project” (Lafer, 2002). Lula da Silva, before the presidential elections in 2002, opposed what he called an “annexation project” of the Latin American continent by the United States (Lula da Silva, 2002a), a vision shared with future representatives of the Brazilian bureaucratic decision making staff (Guimarães, 1999: 119-120).

“We instruct our ministers to assure that the negotiations of the FTAA agreement be concluded in January 2005 at latest […]. This will be the key element towards economic growth and prosperity in the hemisphere, which contributes to the block’s ample objectives. The agreement should be balanced, of wide reach, and consistent with the rules and disciplines of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and should constitute into one commitment. We give great importance to the elaboration of an agreement that takes into consideration the differences in the size and development level of the participating economies” (FTAA, 2001).


the idea of autonomy through diversification left aside the mere technical negotiations to defend national sovereignty and interest, with a more critical outlook on the advantages and disadvantages of free trade in an asymmetric situation in relation to the rich countries. The internal difficulties and resistances encountered by the Lula da Silva government when it comes to foreign policy, comes from the complexity to determine priorities and setting clear and specific national goals. In democratic regimes, the national interests are formed from the preferences of the different groups within the State. In this way, the intra-bureaucratic conflicts reflect the preferential differences that exist in society, and the global discrepant views expressed by the civil servants of the State that contribute toward the foreign policy. In contemporary Brazil, foreign policy goals are collaboratively established by political leaders and staff of the ministry of Foreign Affairs and that of other ministries and national institutions, such as Development, Industry and Commerce, Agriculture, Finance, Environment and the Central Bank.


“We are deeply committed toward the integration of South America [...]. We believe in an ample process of political, social and cultural approximation between countries of the region, primarily through the Mercosul. [...] the Mercosul is a strategic Project and there is a political will of all integrating nations for its deepening” (Lula da Silva, 2002b).

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